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Little time has been given in the conservation movement to developing and clarifying the 
meanings of our intentions, except for those few "ecophilosophers" whom many 
practitioners belittle, and thus ignore, as passive do-nothings who are more interested in 
hermeneutics than really doing something to help wildlife. Still, we are quite happy to 
describe the opposition for "it is always so easy to set down in little square boxes 
someone else's motives, and to impute and attribute and assign perceptions and beliefs to 
others." (Livingston, 1981, p. 14) 
This, for me, is troubling. John Livingston asserts in The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation 
that one of the chief problems we conservationists have caused for ourselves, perhaps 
because we always seem to find ourselves in a reactive (and thus frantic) mode, is that we 
leap into action with little thought to the implications. How can we possibly achieve that 
elusive notion of "wildlife conservation" if, as individuals, we have not taken the time to 
grapple with what it might mean to, and for, us? 
Similarly, if, as a group, we don't have a common usage of terms, what hope do we have 
of understanding each other? We do not all need to have the same definition; like Donna 
Haraway and other "post-modern" theorists, I see no need to search for universality. 
(Haraway, 1989) Still, I think that we ought to at least attempt to understand each other's 
definitions, in the hope of finding some sense of common ground, some core foundation 
from which we all may work. And I do suspect that there is something which most, 
(although not all), conservationists share: a profound attachment to the non-human. 
For the purposes of this essay, then, I will provide a brief taxonomy of the different forms 
conservation has assumed after which I will offer my own understandings of the concept. 
The analysis is not exhaustive but does cover the strongest currents..1. 
Current Definitions 
Words, like wool sweaters, become fuzzy with use. Often academics bemoan the loss of 
purity when technical words become popular, yet this is not necessarily a bad thing as it 
can reflect the evolution and often the democratization of ideas. It can, however, 
contribute to confusion and arguments not based on true disagreement but upon 
semantics. The words "conservation" and "preservation" are good examples of this 
phenomenon. 
Donald Worster, in his history of ecological ideas, identified two streams of thought 
important to the development of the discipline: arcadian and imperialist. The arcadian 
approach could be traced to ideas of Romanticism when spiritual meaning was sought in 
nature, whereas the imperialist approach, rising out of the Baconian "Empire of Reason", 
stripped nature of its spiritual meaning describing it merely as that which ought to be 
controlled for human benefit. Worster says that the dialectic between these two streams is 
important to ecological ideas:
[O]ne might very well cast the history of ecology as a struggle between 
rival views of the relationship between humans and nature: one view 
devoted to the discovery of intrinsic value and its preservation, the other to 
the creation of an instrumentalized world and its exploitation. (1977, p. xi) 
Such a demarcation could, of course, also describe the two primary constituencies in the 
conservation community. Worster's arcadian approach closely resembles preservationism, 
the protection of the non-human for something beyond economic value. Common to this 
approach is a desire to designate wildlife and wildlands as off-limits to human 
intervention. The imperialist approach is akin to "wise-use" resourcist conservation where 
nature is merely a source of food, clothing, tourist spectacle, or anything else that is of 
utility to humanity. Its present configuration is "sustainable development" adopted in 
documents like the I.U.C.N.'s World Conservation Strategy. 
Although preservation and conservation reflects the dichotomy between the arcadian and 
imperialist approaches to ecology, (and they most certainly have their violent 
disagreements),.2. some theorists like Max Oelschlaeger think they have much more in 
common than is at first obvious. In his explication of wilderness philosophy, he identified 
two streams of thought, but for him preservation and conservation swim in the same 
stream: anthropocentrism. 
Oelschlaeger suspects that preservationism lacks a spiritual understanding of nature and 
thus resorts to traditional resourcist arguments as a means to an ends. This is in stark 
contrast to biocentrism or ecocentrism which goes beyond "strict preservationism by 
questioning speciesism" thus abandoning "the idea that humankind is somehow superior 
to and therefore entitled to impose its values on nature." (1991, p. 292) Like other "isms", 
it is described in terms of power relations, in this case, humans over non-humans. 
The white, middle-class values he perceives to be inherent in preservationism is also of 
concern: 
[P]reservationists are easily stereotyped as people who have made their 
fortune and become more interested in protecting birds and wildflowers, 
guaranteeing their access to unspoiled wilderness and cleaning the air and 
water rather than ameliorating the plight...of the underprivileged. (1991, p. 
292) 
Such charges of misanthropy are overstated, perhaps for the sake of clear academic 
categorization. Livingston asserts that such accusations are "cultural constipation at its 
fullest" (1981, p. 116) for it denies the spiritual connections preservationists feel to all 
life, not just the nonhuman. In fact, with perhaps the exception of the really hard-line 
'wise-use' enthusiasts, I would contend that these feelings of connection to other life are 
present in most conservationists. Which brings us to my understanding of conservation. 
Alternate Definitions 
I begin with a bare-bones definition of conservation, the reductionist core upon which I 
will layer meanings for the richness and beauty of complexity. By conservation I mean 
the provision of opportunities for flora and fauna to exist in nature, regardless of their 
perceived utility to humans. For those who admire the non-interventionist approach, 
inclusion of "provision of opportunities" in my definition may set the warning bells 
ringing. I too am uncomfortable with the use of the word "provision" because it can imply 
management of wildlife. I would assert, however, that it is not the wildlife that needs 
management, but ourselves. Humans have caused what often appears to be irrevocable 
damage and those of us who are concerned with these issues must recognize that actions 
toward self-management are vital to conservation. As Oelschlaeger writes: "Whatever an 
individual's idea of wilderness, mere stockpile of natural resources or Mother Earth, the 
mass of humanity so fundamentally alters nature that no laissez-faire position is 
rational." (1991, p. 285) Livingston agrees and adds a temporal perspective: "since the 
crucible out of which these vanishing miracles were formed is all of Earth time, and the 
devastation has taken place in no more than a wink of human time, things are in no 
position to take care of themselves." (1981, p. 19) 
The form such action might take, however, can be debated. Action does not necessarily 
mean legal pursuits or carrying placards in front of legislatures. Rather, it could mean 
simply thinking about issues surrounding wildlife conservation (not to imply that thinking 
is simple), challenging standard ideas about human/nature and human/non-human 
relations, exploring personal connections with wildlife - anything that might help build 
opportunities, openings for change. Neil Evernden, in discussing the utility of "deep 
ecology" or environmental philosophy writes that action could be "simply standing up to 
be counted. A plain testimonial will help precipitate the desired change." (1985, p. 28) It 
is vitally important for all those concerned to lend their voices to the fray. As Arne Naess 
advocated in a keynote address to a Conservation Biology conference: "Will the 
defenders of nature please rise?" (1986, p. 504) 
Yet the activist in me struggles with an approach that appears so theoretical. The 
alternatives, however, do not look any better. David Ehrenfeld writes: 
[P]eople are spending too much valuable time and causing too much 
damage by pretending that our efforts in politics, economics, and 
technology usually have the effects that we intend them to have, especially 
when there are strong environmental interactions involved. We have been 
fooled by our own humanist cant into thinking that we are actually learning 
how to steer the planet in its orbit. (1981, p. 16) 
Despite counsel against such folly, few conservationists listen, especially those who 
adhere to the "wise-use" definition. Inherent in the "sustainable usage" of wildlife is an 
action- oriented approach which relies on science and technology as tools for the proper 
management of wildlife. As historians and philosophers of science have demonstrated, 
however, science is merely one particular way of understanding the world which can be 
both limited and limiting. Barbara Noske, who dissects the scientific worldview in 
Humans and Other Animals: Beyond the Boundaries of Anthropology, writes: 
Positivist science is a type of understanding which seeks to stand apart 
from all value-judgement and value-determination, thereby also reducing 
the object of understanding, nature, to something technical and value-free. 
The wish to regard nature in this way constitutes a value in itself though, 
the value of human power over a nature made to consist entirely of matter, 
transformable for human purposes, bereft of value and meaning. 1989, p. 
56) 
Evernden characterizes the science of Galileo and his successors: "The condition for 
discovery of the real properties of nature - number, size, shape, and so forth, is the 
exclusion of life and all the qualities dependent on it" and adds that the "rise in science.. 
coincides with a drastic diminution in human perception and, contrary to common belief, 
in human understanding as well." (1985, p. 18, 32) So what is missing from the scientific 
approach? For these authors, and for myself, the gaping hole is the lack of recognition of 
context, of the relationships that exist between subject" and "object". Charles Bergman 
writes in Wild Echoes: 
Regardless of the knowledge it may produce, objectivity requires that we 
treat an animal as an object, not as a living creature that struggles, thinks, 
and feels - just as we do. It necessarily separates us from animals, yet we're 
surprised that we don't feel more connected. The blindness of empiricism is 
that it gives us too much faith in the illusions of our eyes. We come to 
believe that what we see is real. In the meanwhile, we have grown illiterate 
in the unconscious attachments to trees and rocks, and we are unaware of 
the deeper strategies and motives that shape our objective relationships to 
the world. (1990, p. 28) 
Therefore, although science is most certainly an interesting and worthy part of our 
understanding of the non-human for its ability to provoke wonder at the miraculous 
workings of life, it cannot be our only approach..3. 
Indeed, Bergman believes that: 
Science cannot tell us how to relate to wild animals, how to treat them, 
what place to make for them in our lives. Our relationships with animals 
cannot be reduced, or confined, to the comforting absolutes of a biologist's 
graph. In fact, the virtue of seeing our relationships with animals, both 
personal and cultural, as something we can choose, as a scenario created by 
us rather than determined for us, is that we are not bound by what has been. 
This view gives us the hope of freedom and change in our relations with 
animals. (1990, p. 23) 
Relations with animals, relationships with animals...that is what is often missing in 
definitions of conservation; that is the common spiritual ground for many 
conservationists. Despite the different world-views or approaches to the non-human, that 
is the glue which might bind. 
For example, associates of mine who work as zookeepers rail loud and long against 
animal rights activists for their perceived radical stances and unrealistic goals. Similarly, 
many of those activists would, I am sure, sneer at the activities of these people who not 
only work in a zoo, but who keep animals in their home for captive breeding and study. 
But although these two groups are on different ends of the conservation continuum and 
see the other group as hopelessly misguided, there still exists a profound attachment in 
both to the non-human. Evernden reminds us that the ecologist "was motivated initially 
by his irrepressible wonder at the existence of life, and the wilderness defender may 
remember that it was his experience, not real estate, that prompted his concern." (1985, p. 
143) So if connection with the non-human is the motivation for commitment to 
conservation, what might that tell us about what conservation means? I concur with 
Evernden when he writes: 
For although [the environmentalists] seldom recognize it, they are 
protesting not the stripping of natural resources but the stripping of earthly 
meaning.... We call people environmentalists because what they are finally 
moved to defend is what we call environment. But, at bottom, their action 
is defense of cosmos, not scenery. (1985, p. 124) 
Hence the realization that "if we do harm to the rest of Nature, we are then harming 
ourselves." (Devall & Sessions, 1984, p. 303) This is not meant in the sense that if frogs 
as indicator species of environmental degradation are dying, we should suspect that we 
too are at risk physically. Rather, the damage is spiritual. 
For example, John Livingston recounts the childhood feelings associated with the 
destruction of a ravine behind his home: 
[I]n the grass by the pond beneath the dogwoods, the toads and the frogs 
and the newts and their hypnotic sunlight had been irreversibly 
incorporated into my world, literally into me. My world was being 
tampered with; I was being invaded. Next spring I would have a piece 
missing, chewed out of me by the ditch diggers. (1981, p. 101) 
His description of his experiences resonated within me. I grew up on a farm near the 
outskirts of a small community in southern Ontario. As a child, I was quite uneasy about 
much involved in livestock farming. I was upset about the dehorning and tagging of the 
cattle, the castrating of piglets, the caging of chickens and, of course, the "harvesting" of 
all of these creatures. As much as my family tried to make me into a good little farmer, I 
was never capable of any of those tasks. 
I was also very disturbed by our treatment of the wild animals with whom we shared the 
land. It seemed to me that anything that wasn't domestic was condemned - the 
groundhogs were shot because the cattle might trip in their holes, the coyotes because 
they might kill sheep, the weasels because they might kill chickens, the porcupines 
because they might strip a few saplings, and the deer because we needed to do the 
humane thing and ensure they did not die a "hard" death of starvation. (What was never 
mentioned, of course, was one of the causes of their starvation - overpopulation from the 
elimination of predators.) I cried, I ranted, I debated - to no avail. I could not understand 
why others didn't share this terrible sense of loss, this pain. 
Bergman writes that the "fact that we define extinction largely in biological terms, instead 
of say, social or psychological terms, is simply an expression of the way we see 
nature." (1990, p. 80) Thus the pieces that are missing from Livingston, myself, and the 
many others who share this compassion are of no portent if a strictly biological 
understanding of extinction, or of conservation, is all that gets to count. But if extinction 
could be understood as a grievous sense of loss, and conservation as a way of avoiding 
this feeling, it would be closer to how I personally experience the phenomenon. 
Similarly, how we define "animal" has great significance to the meanings of 
conservation. Evernden writes: 
[A]n individual is not a thing at all, but a sequence of ways of relating: a 
panorama of views of the world. Concentration on those relationships, and 
on relationship in general, clearly constitutes a substantial alteration in our 
way of understanding the individual. (1985, p. 183) 
Thus, for me, conservation cannot be about preserving merely genes, or habitat, but about 
making room for relationships. Seen in this light, the concept of zoos as tools for 
conservation becomes absurd: 
[A]n animal is not just genes....A solitary gorilla in a zoo is not really a 
gorilla, it is a gorilla-shaped imitation of a social being which can only 
develop fully in a society of kindred beings....To attempt to preserve only a 
package of genes is to accept a very restricted definition of animality and to 
fall into trap of mistaking the skin-encapsulated object for the process of 
relationships that constitutes the creature in question. (Evernden, 1985, p. 
13) 
As Devall and Sessions remind us: "A condor is five percent feathers, flesh, blood, and 
bone. All the rest is place."(1984, p. 317) 
All the rest is place. But what does "place" mean? Some could interpret place as simply 
habitat. But, for me, it is far more than that. It entails a sense of belonging, an 
understanding of relationships. Place is where one's life makes utter sense, place is home. 
Conservation, at its very core, is about providing and maintaining options for place. 
Notes 
1. For more detailed accounts, I would recommend Livingston (1981), Worster (1977) 
and Nash (1982). 
2. Neil Evernden, in discussing the high emotion involved in debates between 
industrialists and environmentalists, could easily have been describing the disagreements 
between conservationists and preservationists: "The environmentalists and the 
industrialist possess differing ideas about the proper order of things. Moreover, since the 
debate is not simply about the physical contamination of nature but about the moral 
contamination of an ideal, there is also an underlying presupposition of "rightness" that 
adds a level of outrage and indignation to the debate." (1992, p. 6) 
3. That is, of course, my opinion. Haraway (1991), in discussing feminist approaches to 
science, notes that feminists are divided into two camps: those who wish to clean up 
science versus those who want to leave it behind altogether. 
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